cause its regulations were better than those of its
rivals, or perhaps as nearly just and right as were well possible,
it was altogether best and right it should be so. The voice of the
people was, in a very rude, stammering way, the voice of God. And
those who survived became more and more obedient, and found
themselves, when disobedient, feeling debased, and mean, and
unworthy, as their fellows considered them. And all this feeling
tended to develop a conscience in the individual answering to the
estimates and regulations of the community.

And remember that the primitive religion is a tribal religion. The
gods felt toward a man just as his neighbors did. A public opinion
of this sort is irresistible, and a man's conscience and estimate of
himself and his actions must conform to it. But you may say a man
may grant that this opinion is in a sense irresistible, and find
himself very miserable and unhappy under its condemnation. But he
would not feel remorse; this is a very different feeling. Possibly
it may be. I am not so sure. But what I am interested in maintaining
is that the condemnation of one's fellow-men puts more vividly
before one's eyes, and emphasizes, the condemnation of one's own
self. It may often be a necessary step in self-conviction. And what
is most important, even in our own case, the condemnation of our
fellows often brings with it self-condemnation.

Try the experiment, as you will some day, of following a course of
action which you feel fairly confident is right, but which all your
neighbors think is foolish and wrong. See if you do not feel twinges
within you which you must examine very closely to distinguish from
twinges of conscience. If you do not, I see but one explanation--you
are conscious that God is with you, and content with this majority.
But in the case of primitive man God was always on the side of one's
tribe.

Now this does not explain the origin of man's conception of right;
it presupposes such a conception in some dim form. I do not now know
why right is right or beauty beautiful. I only know they are so.
Where or when either of these perceptions dawned I do not know. But,
given some such dim perception, I believe that primitive human
society gave it its iron grip on every fibre of man's nature.

Before the animal could safely be allowed to govern itself
intelligently it had to serve a long apprenticeship to reflex action
and instinct. And man's moral nature had to undergo a