atement, as was becoming in an author writing in another
country at a time when the tendencies to which he alludes were only
beginning to show themselves. Things have advanced during the last ten
years in the direction Professor Lowell indicated as probable, and it is
high time that this advance should be stopped.

We might venture to ask, indeed, the following questions: (i) Has not
the Treasury during the last ten years lost a large portion of its
control, and since the War almost its whole control over expenditure on
a large scale? (ii) Is the Treasury not more concerned with paltry
details than in imposing any real check on the extravagance of spending
departments? (iii) Has not the policy sometimes been actually to
encourage expenditure, and has not there been one case at least, even of
introducing vexatious taxation where the amount collected is far less
than the cost of collection? (iv) What has the Treasury done to prevent
or control "the orgy of extravagance" since the War began? The
department of State which has to do with revenue, with getting as much
as possible and spending only what is necessary, which has the duty of
"making both ends meet," ought to resume its functions and regain its
influence so that the Government may be conducted "on strict business
principles," to use Professor Lowell's phrase, "as it was throughout a
great part of the nineteenth century."

(3) The Cabinet should exercise more controlling power, and recognise
its collective responsibility for keeping down expenditure. As Professor
Lowell points out, the position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in
the Cabinet was one of almost commanding influence. In Mr. Gladstone's
time his powerful personality, regularly exercised in favour of national
economy, did certainly have a great effect in preventing extravagance,
and some other Chancellors of the Exchequer no doubt used an influence
in that direction, but can it be safely asserted that there is in the
Cabinet as a whole sufficient attention given to retrenchment?

(4) Lastly, the House of Commons is supposed to control expenditure.
That control has generally been used, and quite rightly, as a means of
calling attention to grievances, and as giving an opportunity for
criticism of the executive; but the House of Commons should also put
pressure on the executive to curtail expenditure, not so much by
discussing small details which would be far better dealt with by such a
small Estimates