of the trials; not exactly assuming them
for true, and resting any other truth upon their credit, but repeating
them as parts _inter alia_ of current popular hearsay. Now this,
though probably the act of some subordinate officer, does a double
indignity to Government; it is discreditable to the understanding, if
such palpable nursery tales are adopted for any purpose; and openly to
adulterate with falsehood, even in those cases where the falsehood is
not associated with folly, still more deeply wounds the character of
an honourable government. But, besides, had the numerical estimates
stood upon any footing of truth, mere numbers could not have been
pleaded as an argument for reasonable alarm. The false estimate was
not pleaded by the Repealers until _after_ the meetings, and as an
inference from facts. But the use of the argument was _before_ the
meeting, and to prevent the meeting. And if the experience of past
meetings were urged as an argument for presuming that the coming one
would be not less numerous, concurrently would be urged this same
experience as a demonstration that no danger was to be apprehended.
Dangerous the meetings certainly were in another sense; but, in the
police sense, so little dangerous, that each successive meeting
squared, cubed, &c., in geometrical progression the guarantee in point
of safety for all meetings that were to follow.

2. On the ground of _sedition_, and disaffection to the Government,
might not these assemblages have been lawfully dispersed or prevented?
Unfortunately, not under our modern atmosphere of political
liberality. In time of war, when it may again become necessary, for
the very salvation of the land, to suspend the _habeas corpus_ act,
sedition would revive into a new meaning. But, at all times, sedition
is of too unlimited a nature to form the basis of an affidavit sworn
before a police magistrate; and it is an idea which very much
sympathizes with the _general_ principles of political rights. When
these are unusually licentious, sedition is interpreted liberally and
laxly. Where danger tightens the restraints upon popular liberty, the
idea of sedition is more narrowly defined. Sedition, besides, very
much depends upon overt acts as expounding it. And to take any
controversial ground for the basis of restraint upon personal liberty,
would probably end in disappointment. At the same time, we must make
one remark. Some months ago, in considering what offence was commit