tuation in the Soudan.

Gordon left Cairo still considering the matter. So soon as he made his
formal demand from Khartoum for the assistance of Zubehr it was evident
that his belief in the old slave dealer's usefulness was a sound
conviction and not a mere passing caprice. Besides, he had now become
'the man on the spot,' and as such his words carried double force. Sir
Evelyn Baring determined to support the recommendation with his whole
influence. Never was so good a case made out for the appointment of so
bad a man. The Envoy Extraordinary asked for him; Colonel Stewart, his
colleague, concurred; the British Agent strongly urged the request; the
Egyptian Government were unanimous; and behind all these were ranged
every single person who had the slightest acquaintance with the Soudan.
nothing could exceed the vigour with which the demand was made. On the
1st of March General Gordon telegraphed: 'I tell you plainly, it is
impossible to get Cairo employees out of Khartoum unless the Government
helps in the way I told you. They refuse Zubehr.... but it was the only
chance.' And again on the 8th: 'If you do not send Zubehr, you have
no chance of getting the garrisons away.' 'I believe,' said Sir Evelyn
Baring in support of these telegrams, 'that General Gordon is quite
right when he says that Zubehr Pasha is the only possible man. Nubar is
strongly in favour of him. Dr. Bohndorf, the African traveller, fully
confirms what General Gordon says of the influence of Zubehr.' The Pasha
was vile, but indispensable.

Her Majesty's Government refused absolutely to have anything to do with
Zubehr. They declined to allow the Egyptian Government to employ him.
They would not entertain the proposal, and scarcely consented to discuss
it. The historians of the future may occupy their leisure and exercise
their wits in deciding whether the Ministers and the people were right
or wrong; whether they had a right to indulge their sensitiveness at
so terrible a cost; whether they were not more nice than wise; whether
their dignity was more offended by what was incurred or by what was
avoided.

General Gordon has explained his views very clearly and concisely: 'Had
Zubehr Pasha been sent up when I asked for him, Berber would in
all probability never have fallen, and one might have made a Soudan
Government in opposition to the Mahdi. We choose to refuse his coming
up because of his antecedents in re slave trade; granted that we had
reason, y