Soudanese riflemen were
famous for their valour. For some hours a bloody struggle appeared
imminent. Then the confederacy broke up. The Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu, a
prudent man, talked of compromise and amity. The Khalif Sherif,
thus seriously weakened, hastened to make peace while time remained.
Eventually both bowed to the superior force of the ruler and the
superior courage of his followers. Once they had submitted, their power
was gone. Abdullah reduced their forces to a personal escort of fifty
men each, deprived them of their flags and their war-drums--the emblems
of royalty--and they became for the future the useful supporters of a
Government they were unable to subvert.

To other less powerful and more stubborn enemies he showed a greater
severity. The Mahdi's two uncles, named respectively Abdel Kerim
and Abdel Kader, were thrown chained into prison, their houses were
destroyed, and their wives and other property confiscated. The numerous
persons who claimed to be of the 'Ashraf' found the saintly honour
a burden upon earth; for, in order to keep them out of mischief, the
Khalifa enjoined them to attend five times every day at the prayers in
the mosque. Eighteen months of these devotions, declares the Christian
chronicler, were considered 'the highest punishment.' [Ohrwalder, TEN
YEARS' CAPTIVITY.] Still more barbarous was the treatment meted out to
the unfortunate Emir who had charge of the Treasury. Ahmed Wad Suliman
had been accustomed under the Mahdi's mild rule to keep no public
accounts, and consequently he had amassed a large fortune. He was
actively hostile to Abdullah, and proclaimed his sympathy with the
Ashraf. Whereupon the Khalifa invited him to give an account of his
stewardship. This he was, of course, unable to do. He was then dismissed
from his appointment. His private property was taken to fill the
deficiencies of the State, and the brutal population of Omdurman
applauded his punishment as 'an act of justice.' [Slatin, FIRE AND
SWORD.]

Although the Khalifa might establish his authority by such atrocities,
its maintenance depended on the military policy which he consistently
pursued. The terrible power of a standing army may usually be exerted by
whoever can control its leaders, as a mighty engine is set in motion by
the turning of a handle. Yet to turn the handle some muscular force is
necessary. Abdullah knew that to rule the Soudan he must have a great
army. To make the great army obedient he