uld fight him with his own weapons: should
descend to the arena of deceit in which the countrymen of Aminchand
were past-masters. Possibly the atmosphere he breathed in such
society was answerable, to a great extent, for this deviation from
the path of honour. But the stain remains. No washing will remove it.
It affected him whilst he still lived, and will never disappear.

[Footnote 16: In his evidence before the Committee of the House of
Commons Clive said regarding the fictitious treaty: 'It was sent to
Admiral Watson, who objected to the signing of it; but, to the best
of his remembrance, gave the gentleman who carried it (Mr.
Lushington) leave to sign his name upon it.']

Then again, as to his dealings with Siraj-ud-daula and Mir Jafar. The
whole proceedings of Clive after his capture of Calcutta prove that
he intended to direct all his policy to the removal of that young
prince from the _masnad_. Some have thought that the Black Hole
tragedy was the cause of this resolve. But this can hardly be so, for
Mir Jafar, the commander-in-chief of the army which seized Calcutta
in 1756, was equally implicated in that transaction. The suggestion
that Siraj-ud-daula was intriguing with the French at Haidarabad is
equally untenable, for Clive knew he had little cause to fear their
hostility. Clive not only expelled that prince, but, by his policy,
his extortions, his insistance to obtain control of the saltpetre
traffic, rendered it impossible for his successor to govern. Success
attended his policy so long as he remained on the spot to control his
subordinates, but it was inevitable that, sooner or later, there
would come {136}a revulsion. The warlike natives of Bihar had not
been conquered, and they knew it. They had helped Clive, not that
they should become subject to the foreigner from the sea, but that
they might have a native ruler whom they trusted, in place of one
whom they disliked. When they realized that the result of this change
was not only subjection to the islanders, but impoverishment to
themselves, they broke into what was called rebellion, and showed on
many a bloody field that it was not they, only Siraj-ud-daula, who
had been conquered at Plassey.

This was the most dangerous legacy of the policy and action of Clive.
He recognized its shadowy existence. He wrote to his successor, Mr.
Vansittart, when he transferred to him his own office, that the only
danger he had to dread in Bengal was that which migh