no longer. It
is otherwise in France. The vastness of her territory and her population
render the burden easy that would make a bankrupt of a country like
England.

It is not the weight of a thing, but the numbers who are to bear that
weight, that makes it feel light or heavy to the shoulders of those who
bear it. A land-tax of half as much in the pound as the land-tax is in
England, will raise nearly four times as much revenue in France as is
raised in England. This is a scale easily understood, by which all the
other sections of productive revenue can be measured. Judge then of the
difference of natural ability.

England is strong in a navy; but that navy costs about eight millions
sterling a-year, and is one of the causes that has hastened her
bankruptcy. The history of navy bills sufficiently proves this. But
strong as England is in this case, the fate of navies must finally be
decided by the natural ability of each country to carry its navy to the
greatest extent; and France is able to support a navy twice as large as
that of England, with less than half the expense per head on the people,
which the present navy of England costs.

We all know that a navy cannot be raised as expeditiously as an army.
But as the average duration of a navy, taking the decay of time, storms,
and all circumstances and accidents together, is less than twenty years,
every navy must be renewed within that time; and France at the end of a
few years, can create and support a navy of double the extent of that of
England; and the conduct of the English government will provoke her to
it.

But of what use are navies otherwise than to make or prevent invasions?
Commercially considered, they are losses. They scarcely give any
protection to the commerce of the countries which have them, compared
with the expense of maintaining them, and they insult the commerce of
the nations that are neutral.

During the American war, the plan of the armed neutrality was formed and
put in execution: but it was inconvenient, expensive, and ineffectual.
This being the case, the problem is, does not commerce contain within
itself, the means of its own protection? It certainly does, if the
neutral nations will employ that means properly.

Instead then of an _armed neutrality_, the plan should be directly the
contrary. It should be an _unarmed neutrality_. In the first place,
the rights of neutral nations are easily defined. They are such as are
exercised by n