even upon any subject, is sufficiently
just.(1)

1 For Paine's ideas on the right division of representatives
into two chambers, which differ essentially from any
bicameral system ever adopted, see vol. ii., p. 444 of this
work; also, in the present volume, Chapter XXXIV.--
_Editor._.

The policy of renewing the Legislature by a third part each year, though
not entirely new, either in theory or in practice, is nevertheless one
of the modern improvements in the science of government. It prevents,
on the one hand, that convulsion and precipitate change of measures
into which a nation might be surprised by the going out of the whole
Legislature at the same time, and the instantaneous election of a new
one; on the other hand, it excludes that common interest from taking
place that might tempt a whole Legislature, whose term of duration
expired at once, to usurp the right of continuance. I go now to speak of
the Executive.

It is a principle uncontrovertible by reason, that each of the parts
by which government is composed, should be so constructed as to be in
perpetual maturity. We should laugh at the idea of a Council of Five
Hundred, or a Council of Ancients, or a Parliament, or any national
assembly, who should be all children in leading strings and in the
cradle, or be all sick, insane, deaf, dumb, lame or blind, at the same
time, or be all upon crutches, tottering with age or infirmities. Any
form of government that was so constructed as to admit the possibility
of such cases happening to a whole Legislature would justly be the
ridicule of the world; and on a parity of reasoning, it is equally as
ridiculous that the same cases should happen in that part of government
which is called the Executive; yet this is the contemptible condition to
which an Executive is always subject, and which is often happening,
when it is placed in an hereditary individual called a king. When
that individual is in either of the cases before mentioned, the whole
Executive is in the same case; for himself is the whole. He is then (as
an Executive) the ridiculous picture of what a Legislature would be if
all its members were in the same case. The one is a whole made up of
parts, the other a whole without parts; and anything happening to the
one, (as a part or sec-tion of the government,) is parallel to the same
thing happening to the other.

As, therefore, an hereditary executive called a king is a perfect
absurdi