attempt
any modification of it, we plunge into a labyrinth of difficulties from
which there is no way out but by retreating. Where are we to stop? Or
by what principle are we to find out the point to stop at, that shall
discriminate between men of the same country, part of whom shall be
free, and the rest not? If property is to be made the criterion, it is
a total departure from every moral principle of liberty, because it
is attaching rights to mere matter, and making man the agent of that
matter. It is, moreover, holding up property as an apple of discord,
and not only exciting but justifying war against it; for I maintain the
principle, that when property is used as an instrument to take away the
rights of those who may happen not to possess property, it is used to an
unlawful purpose, as fire-arms would be in a similar case.

In a state of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal
in power; the weak cannot protect themselves against the strong. This
being the case, the institution of civil society is for the purpose
of making an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to, and
a guarantee of, the equality of rights. The laws of a country, when
properly constructed, apply to this purpose. Every man takes the arm of
the law for his protection as more effectual than his own; and therefore
every man has an equal right in the formation of the government, and
of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged. In extensive
countries and societies, such as America and France, this right in the
individual can only be exercised by delegation, that is, by election and
representation; and hence it is that the institution of representative
government arises.

Hitherto, I have confined myself to matters of principle only. First,
that hereditary government has not a right to exist; that it cannot be
established on any principle of right; and that it is a violation of all
principle. Secondly, that government by election and representation has
its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man; for whether a man
be his own lawgiver, as he would be in a state of nature; or whether he
exercises his portion of legislative sovereignty in his own person, as
might be the case in small democracies where all could assemble for the
formation of the laws by which they were to be governed; or whether he
exercises it in the choice of persons to represent him in a national
assembly of representatives, the origin of the