he Declaration of Rights says:

"Liberty consists in such acts of volition as are not injurious to
others."

But the article of the Constitution, on which I have observed, breaks
down this barrier. It enables the liberty of one part of society to
destroy the freedom of the other.

Having thus pointed out the inconsistency of this article to the
Declaration of Rights, I shall proceed to comment on that of the same
article which makes a direct contribution a necessary qualification to
the right of citizenship.

A modern refinement on the object of public revenue has divided the
taxes, or contributions, into two classes, the _direct_ and the_
indirect_, without being able to define precisely the distinction or
difference between them, because the effect of both is the same.

Those are designated indirect taxes which fall upon the consumers of
certain articles, on which the tax is imposed, because, the tax being
included in the price, the consumer pays it without taking notice of it.

The same observation is applicable to the territorial tax. The land
proprietors, in order to reimburse themselves, will rack-rent their
tenants: the farmer, of course, will transfer the obligation to the
miller, by enhancing the price of grain; the miller to the baker, by
increasing the price of flour; and the baker to the consumer, by raising
the price of bread. The territorial tax, therefore, though called
_direct_, is, in its consequences, _indirect_.

To this tax the land proprietor contributes only in proportion to the
quantity of bread and other provisions that are consumed in his own
family. The deficit is furnished by the great mass of the community,
which comprehends every individual of the nation.

From the logical distinction between the direct and in-direct taxation,
some emolument may result, I allow, to auditors of public accounts, &c.,
but to the people at large I deny that such a distinction (which by the
by is without a difference) can be productive of any practical
benefit. It ought not, therefore, to be admitted as a principle in the
constitution.

Besides this objection, the provision in question does not affect to
define, secure, or establish the right of citizenship. It consigns to
the caprice or discretion of the legislature the power of pronouncing
who shall, or shall not, exercise the functions of a citizen; and
this may be done effectually, either by the imposition of a _direct or
indirect_ tax, according t