the right wing under Birney
consisting of the three divisions of Birney, Mott and Getty; the left
wing of Gibbon's and Barlow's divisions under Gibbon. Barlow, as has
been seen, was to look out for the left. "The left" was well looked
after by Sheridan's cavalry for, aside from Custer's two brigades which
were directly in contact with Barlow's left flank, Gregg's division was
posted at Todd's Tavern, still farther to the left.

Sedgwick and Warren attacked Ewell at the hour, but were unsuccessful.
Hancock's assault upon Hill was completely successful, although
Longstreet arrived in the nick of time to save Hill. But Hancock's
attack was with his right wing under Birney, and Longstreet struck the
left of Birney's command. Where were the two divisions of Gibbon, posted
for the very purpose of looking out for Longstreet?

In General A.A. Humphrey's, "Virginia Campaigns," page 40, we read:

"At seven a.m., General Hancock sent a staff officer to General
Gibbon, informing him of the success of his right wing, and directing
him to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's division. This order
was only partially obeyed. Had Barlow's division advanced as
directed, he (General Hancock) felt confident that the enemy's force
would have been defeated. The cause of his failure was probably owing
to the expected approach of Longstreet on his (Barlow's) left."

Again:

"At 8:30 a.m., Hancock began an attack with Birney's wing and
Gibbon's division of the left wing."

General Grant, in his memoirs, (pp. 196-197):

"Hancock was ready to advance, but learning that Longstreet was
threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by
General Barlow, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was
expected."

General Sheridan, (memoirs, vol. I, pp. 362-363):

"On the sixth, General Meade became alarmed about his left flank and
sent a dispatch, saying: 'Hancock has been heavily pressed and his
left turned. You had better draw in your cavalry to protect the
trains.'"

And again:

"On the morning of the sixth, Custer's and Devin's brigades had been
severely engaged before I received the above note. They had been most
successful in repulsing the enemy's attacks, and I felt that the line
could be held. But the despatch from General Hancock was alarming, so
I drew all the cavalry close in around Chancellorsville."

Grant's memoirs, once more:

"The