ing the enemy, if enemy there was, making a feint of moving
away so as to deceive, but keeping an ear to windward to catch the first
sound of danger. It has always seemed to the writer that General Custer
must have had a motive which did not appear on the surface, in giving
that order. His order was to go 500 yards. Five hundred yards would have
brought us to the woods. If he suspected that there might be an enemy
there, no surer way to find out whether his suspicions were well founded
or not could have been chosen. One thing is certain. He was back in an
incredibly short space of time. It may be that he heard the sound of
firing and was on his way when the adjutant found him.

Fitzhugh Lee followed Custer half way to Gainesville and then withdrew.
Near that place was found a line of federal infantry sent out to support
the cavalry, but it did not advance far enough to get into the fight.

That night, Kilpatrick invited all the officers of the division to his
headquarters and made a sorry attempt at merry-making over the events of
the day. There were milk-punch and music, both of very good quality, but
the punch, palatable as it undeniably was, did not serve to take away
the bad taste left by the affair, especially among the officers of the
First brigade. Custer's men did not feel so badly. They had saved their
bacon and their battery, and the wariness, prudence and pluck of their
young commander had prevented a much more serious disaster than had
actually happened.

It may be of interest enough to mention that Fitz. Lee told the writer,
in Yorktown, in 1881, that Stuart was at fault in stopping to fight at
Buckland Mills; that, under the arrangement with him (Lee) Stuart should
have fallen back very rapidly, without making any resistance whatever,
until he had lured Kilpatrick with his entire division some distance
beyond the bridge. In that event, General Lee would have found the
opportunity he was seeking. But he did not know about Custer's action in
insisting on stopping there. He was much surprised when informed of the
true state of things, since he had felt that Stuart was blameworthy in
the matter. He had supposed that it was Stuart's resistance to the
federal advance which kept Custer's brigade back until his arrival, and
foiled his well planned attempt.

CHAPTER XV

WINTER QUARTERS IN STEVENSBURG

In the month of November, 1863, the army of the Potomac recrossed the
Rappahannock and the army of No