r. The American
reply to the British notes was not dispatched until October 21, 1915,
further friction with Germany having intervened over the _Arabic_. It
constituted the long-deferred protest which ex-Secretary Bryan vainly
urged the President to make to Great Britain simultaneously with the
sending of the third _Lusitania_ note to Germany. The President
declined to consider the issues on the same footing or as susceptible
to equitable diplomatic survey unless kept apart.
The note embraced a study of eight British communications made to the
American Government in 1915 up to August 13, relating to blockade
restrictions on American commerce imposed by Great Britain. It had
been delayed in the hope that the announced intention of the British
Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible
consideration for the interest of neutrals," and their intention of
"removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American
cargoes," and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience
to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurance
to the United States Government that they would make it their first
aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken
by the allied governments," would in practice not unjustifiably
infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in
trade and commerce. The hope had not been realized.
The detentions of American vessels and cargoes since the opening of
hostilities, presumably under the British Orders in Council of August
20 and October 29, 1914, and March 11, 1915, formed one specific
complaint. In practice these detentions, the United States contended,
had not been uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of
seizure. Many vessels had been detained while search was made for
evidence of the contraband character of cargoes, or of intention to
evade the nonintercourse measures of Great Britain. The question
became one of evidence to support a belief--in many cases a bare
suspicion--of enemy destination or of enemy origin of the goods
involved. The United States raised the point that this evidence should
be obtained by search at sea, and that the vessel and cargo should not
be taken to a British port for the purpose unless incriminating
circumstances warranted such action. International practice to support
this view was cited. Naval orders of the United States, Great Britain,
Russia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and F
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