s assured by victory on land. The
leader first selected, Santa Cruz--a veteran of Lepanto--at least
put naval considerations uppermost and laid plans on a grand scale,
calling for 150 major ships and 100,000 men, 30,000 of them sailors.
But with his death in 1587 the campaign was again thought of primarily
from the army standpoint. The ships were conceived as so many
transports, whose duty at most was to hold the English fleet at
bay. Parma was to be supreme. To succeed Santa Cruz as naval leader,
and in order, it is said, that the gray-haired autocrat Philip
might still control from his cell in the Escorial, the Duke of
Medina Sidonia was chosen--an amiable gentleman of high rank, but
consciously ignorant of naval warfare, uncertain of purpose, and
despondent almost from the start. Medina had an experienced Vice
Admiral in Diego Flores de Valdes, whose professional advice he
usually followed, and he had able squadron commanders in Recalde,
Pedro de Valdes, Oquendo, and others; but such a commander-in-chief,
unless a very genius in self-effacement, was enough to ruin a far
more auspicious campaign.

Delayed by the uncertain political situation in France, even more
than by Drake's exploits off Cadiz, the Armada was at last, in
May of 1588, ready to depart. The success of the Catholic party
under the leadership of the Duke of Guise gave assurance of support
rather than hostility on the French flank. There were altogether
some 130 ships, the best of which were 10 war galleons of Portugal
and 10 of the "Indian Guard" of Spain. These were supported by
the Biscayan, Andalusian, Guipuscoan, and Levantine squadrons of
about 10 armed merchantmen each, four splendid Neapolitan galleasses
that gave a good account of themselves in action, and four galleys
that were driven upon the French coast by storms and took no part
in the battle--making a total (without the galleys) of about 64
fighting ships. Then there were 35 or more pinnaces and small craft,
and 23 _urcas_ or storeships of little or no fighting value. The
backbone of the force was the 60 galleons, large, top-lofty vessels,
all but 20 of them from the merchant service, with towering poops
and forecastles that made them terrible to look upon but hard to
handle. On board were 8,000 sailors and 19,000 troops.

Dispersed by a storm on their departure from Lisbon, the fleet
again assembled at Corunna, their victuals already rotten, and
their water foul and short. Medina Sidon