ure not by reflection upon his own mental processes or
requirements, but by experiment with and observation of natural
processes themselves. The result has been the establishment of modern
science--the greatest triumph which the human mind has yet achieved.

In a criticism of the writer's essay on _The Dynamic
Foundation of Knowledge_ in the _Revue neo-scolastique_ of
Louvain, the critic wrote as follows: "Remarquons qu'il n'a
pas compris la synthese scolastique du moyen age, elle qui
cependant a concilie d'une facon admirable l'_actuel_ et le
_potentiel_ dans l'explication de la nature des choses. Il
s'est mepris aussi sur les caracteres de la methode
scolastique de connaitre la constitution intime du monde
experimental; il croit cette methode exclusivement deductive."

We have felt that candour demanded that we should quote the
foregoing passage--coming as it does from a source
exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion. If we have
nevertheless allowed ourselves in the precedent paragraphs of
this essay to express again the view which this critic seeks
to qualify, but which we still think in the main sound, we are
at the same time very glad to be able in this way to invite
attention to the undoubted fact that the distinction between
the actual and the potential was recognised by the schoolmen
as of a very deep significance. We believe further that the
real secret of the failure of mediaevalism to extend its
Knowledge of Nature was not so much a preference for
deductive over inductive methods as the failure to realise
that Nature was a dynamic operation.

It is important, then, to understand accurately what is the method of
Science.

The external world of our Experience seems to be composed of sensible
impressions. The ever present visual panorama combined with the constant
occurrence of other sensations suggests that Nature is, as has so often
been asserted, simply another name for the sensible presentation. A
truer view of Nature was adumbrated by Aristotle when he formulated the
theory of an Energy ever generative of the sensible. If the founders of
Science did not fully grasp the Aristotelian conception, it is at least
certain that they looked upon Nature not merely as a sensible
presentation but as a process--a dynamic operation. It was to the study
of these operations, to the measurement