not be
shaken in his belief that the real object of the Americans was his own
army; and it was not until September 6 that he fully realized that his
enemy was going to the south, and that Cornwallis was in danger. He
even then hesitated and delayed, but finally dispatched Admiral Graves
with the fleet to the Chesapeake. The Admiral came upon the French
early on September 5, the very day that Washington was rejoicing in
the news that De Grasse had arrived in the Chesapeake and had landed
St. Simon and three thousand men to support Lafayette. As soon as the
English fleet appeared, the French, although many of their men were
on shore, sailed out and gave battle. An indecisive action ensued, in
which the British suffered so much that five days later they burned
one of their frigates and withdrew to New York. De Grasse returned to
his anchorage, to find that De Barras had come in from Newport with
eight ships and ten transports carrying ordnance.

While everything was thus moving well toward the consummation of the
campaign, Washington, in the midst of his delicate and important work
of breaking camp and beginning his rapid march to the south, was
harassed by the ever-recurring difficulties of the feeble and bankrupt
government of the confederation. He wrote again and again to Morris
for money, and finally got some. His demands for men and supplies
remained almost unheeded, but somehow he got provisions enough to
start. He foresaw the most pressing need, and sent messages in all
directions for shipping to transport his army down the Chesapeake. No
one responded, but still he gathered the transports; at first a few,
then more, and finally, after many delays, enough to move his army to
Yorktown. The spectacle of such a struggle, so heroically made, one
would think, might have inspired every soul on the continent with
enthusiasm; but at this very moment, while Washington was breaking
camp and marching southward, Congress was considering the reduction
of the army!--which was as appropriate as it would have been for the
English Parliament to have reduced the navy on the eve of Trafalgar,
or for Lincoln to have advised the restoration of the army to a peace
footing while Grant was fighting in the Wilderness. The fact was that
the Continental Congress was weakened in ability and very tired in
point of nerve and will-power. They saw that peace was coming, and
naturally thought that the sooner they could get it the better. They
ent