affairs of his own army,
all that has just been said comes out with entire clearness, and it is
astonishing to see how exactly events justified his foresight. If
he could only hold Howe in the south, he was quite willing to trust
Burgoyne to the rising of the people and to the northern wilderness.
Every effort he made was in this direction, beginning, as has been
said, by his appeals to the New England governors in March. Schuyler,
on his part, was thoroughly imbued with Washington's other leading
idea, that the one way to victory was by retarding the enemy. At the
outset everything went utterly and disastrously wrong. Washington
counted on an obstinate struggle, and a long delay at Ticonderoga, for
he had not been on the ground, and could not imagine that our officers
would fortify everything but the one commanding point.

The loss of the forts appalled the country and disappointed
Washington, but did not shake his nerve for an instant. He wrote to
Schuyler: "This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much.
But notwithstanding things at present have a dark and gloomy aspect,
I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General
Burgoyne's army, and that the confidence derived from his success will
hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable
to us. We should never despair; our situation has before been
unpromising, and has changed for the better; so I trust it will again.
If new difficulties arise we must only put forth new exertions, and
proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times." Even after this
seemingly crushing defeat he still felt sure of Burgoyne, so long as
he was unsupported. Suiting the action to the word, he again bent
every nerve to rouse New England and get out her militia. When he was
satisfied that Howe was landing below Philadelphia, the first thing he
did was to send forth the same cry in the same quarter, to bring out
more men against Burgoyne. He showed, too, the utmost generosity
toward the northern army, sending thither all the troops he could
possibly spare, and even parting with his favorite corps of Morgan's
riflemen. Despite his liberality, the commanders in the north
were unreasonable in their demands, and when they asked too much,
Washington flatly declined to send more men, for he would not weaken
himself unduly, and he knew what they did not see, that the fate of
the northern invasion turned largely on his own ability to cope with
Howe