elves within eight or ten miles of
each other. Washington now determined to risk a battle in the field,
despite his inferiority in every way. He accordingly issued a
stirring proclamation to the soldiers, and then fell back behind the
Brandywine, to a strong position, and prepared to contest the passage
of the river.

Early on September 11, the British advanced to Chad's Ford, where
Washington was posted with the main body, and after some skirmishing
began to cannonade at long range. Meantime Cornwallis, with the main
body, made a long detour of seventeen miles, and came upon the right
flank and rear of the Americans. Sullivan, who was on the right, had
failed to guard the fords above, and through lack of information was
practically surprised. Washington, on rumors that the enemy were
marching toward his right, with the instinct of a great soldier was
about to cross the river in his front and crush the enemy there, but
he also was misled and kept back by false reports. When the truth was
known, it was too late. The right wing had been beaten and flung back,
the enemy were nearly in the rear, and were now advancing in earnest
in front. All that man could do was done. Troops were pushed forward
and a gallant stand was made at various points; but the critical
moment had come and gone, and there was nothing for it but a hasty
retreat, which came near degenerating into a rout.

The causes of this complete defeat, for such it was, are easily seen.
Washington had planned his battle and chosen his position well. If he
had not been deceived by the first reports, he even then would have
fallen upon and overwhelmed the British centre before they could
have reached his right wing. But the Americans, to begin with, were
outnumbered. They had only eleven thousand effective men, while the
British brought fifteen of their eighteen thousand into action. Then
the Americans suffered, as they constantly did, from misinformation,
and from an absence of system in learning the enemy's movements.
Washington's attack was fatally checked in this way, and Sullivan
was surprised from the same causes, as well as from his own culpable
ignorance of the country beyond him, which was the reason of his
failure to guard the upper fords. The Americans lost, also, by the
unsteadiness of new troops when the unexpected happens, and when
the panic-bearing notion that they are surprised and likely to be
surrounded comes upon them with a sudden shock.

This