believed) ever imagined such a thing as a
dissolution of a corporation by a judgment in law until that day. At the
conclusion of his speech the further hearing of the case was adjourned
until April.

(M786)

On the resumption of the hearing (27 April)(1534) Sir Robert Sawyer, the
attorney-general, at whose suggestion and by whose authority the writ
against the City had been issued, took up the argument, commencing his
speech with an attempt to allay the apprehension excited by the prospect
of forfeiture of the City's charter. "It was not the king's intention," he
said, "to demolish at once all their liberties and to lay waste and open
the city of London, and to reduce it to the condition of a country
village," as some had maliciously reported, but to amend the government of
the City "by running off those excesses and exorbitances of power which
some men (contrary to their duty and the known laws of the land) have
assumed to themselves under colour of their corporate capacity, to the
reviling of their prince, the oppression of their fellow subjects and to
the infinite disquiet of their fellow citizens."(1535) History had shown
that the City had never been better governed than when it was in the
king's hands. Its ancient customs had not been destroyed, but only
restrained in subordination to the general government of the kingdom, and
therefore the danger now threatened would not prove so fatal to the City
as had been suggested.

(M787)

After the conclusion of the arguments on both sides, nearly three months
were allowed to pass before judgment was given, in the hope that the
citizens of London might follow the example set by Norwich, Evesham and
other boroughs, and freely surrender their charter. "I do believe nobody
here wishes this case should come to judgment," was the remark made by
Chief Justice Saunders at the conclusion of the hearing; but at length the
patience of the Crown or of the judges was exhausted, and judgment was
pronounced (12 June) by Justice Jones in the absence of the Lord Chief
Justice, who was now on the point of death. Briefly, the judgment
pronounced was to the effect (1) that a corporation aggregate might be
seized; (2) that exacting and taking money by a "pretended" by-law was
extortion and a forfeiture of franchise; (3) that the petition was
scandalous and libellous, and the making and publishing it a forfeiture;
(4) that an Act of Common Council is an Act of the Corporation; (5) that
the