overwhelmingly successful, might
really have revived its spirit. In any case Jefferson Davis, unlike
Lincoln, had no desire to be guided by his best officers. He was for
ever quarrelling with Joseph Johnston and often with Beauregard; the less
capable Bragg, though removed from the West, was now installed as his
chief adviser in Richmond; and the genius of Lee was not encouraged to
apply itself to the larger strategy of the war.

At the beginning of 1864 an advance from Chattanooga southward into the
heart of the Confederate country was in contemplation. Grant and
Farragut wished that it should be supported by a joint military and naval
attack upon Mobile, in Alabama, on the Gulf of Mexico. Other
considerations on the part of the Government prevented this. In 1863
Marshal Bazaine had invaded Mexico to set up Louis Napoleon's ill-fated
client the Archduke Maximilian as Emperor. As the so-called "Monroe
Doctrine" (really attributable to the teaching of Hamilton and the action
of John Quincy Adams, who was Secretary of State under President Monroe)
declared, such an extension of European influence, more especially
dynastic influence, on the American continent was highly unacceptable to
the United States. Many in the North were much excited, so much so that
during 1864 a preposterous resolution, which meant, if anything, war with
France, was passed on the motion of one Henry Winter Davis. It was of
course the business of Lincoln and of Seward, now moulded to his views,
to avoid this disaster, and yet, with such dignity as the situation
allowed, keep the French Government aware of the enmity which they might
one day incur. They did this. But they apprehended that the French,
with a footing for the moment in Mexico, had designs on Texas; and thus,
though the Southern forces in Texas were cut off from the rest of the
Confederacy and there was no haste for subduing them, it was thought
expedient, with an eye on France, to assert the interest of the Union in
Texas. General Banks, in Louisiana, was sent to Texas with the forces
which would otherwise have been sent to Mobile. His various endeavours
ended in May, 1864, with the serious defeat of an expedition up the Red
River. This defeat gave great annoyance to the North and made an end of
Banks' reputation. It might conceivably have had a calamitous sequel in
the capture by the South of Admiral Porter's river flotilla, which
accompanied Banks, and the consequent undo