religion at all. In the former case, therefore, as your law would be
unnecessary, in the latter it would be persecuting: that is, it would
put your penalty and his ideas of duty in the opposite scales; which is,
or I know not what is, the precise idea of persecution. If, then, you
require a renunciation of his conscience, as a preliminary to his
admission to the rights of society, you annex, morally speaking, an
impossible condition to it. In this case, in the language of reason and
jurisprudence, the condition would be void, and the gift absolute; as
the practice runs, it is to establish the condition, and to withhold the
benefit. The suffering is, then, not voluntary. And I never heard any
other argument, drawn from the nature of laws and the good of human
society, urged in favor of those proscriptive statutes, except those
which have just been mentioned.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] Cicero _de Legibus_, Lib. L 14,15 et 16.--"O rem dignam, in qua non
modo docti, verum etiam agrestes erubescant! Jam vero illud stultissimum
existimare omnia justa esse, quae scita sint in populorum institutis aut
legibus," etc. "Quod si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si
sententiis judicum jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari, jus
adulterare, jus testamenta falsa supponere, si haec suffragiis aut scitis
multitudinis probarentur."

CHAPTER III.

PART II.

The second head upon which I propose to consider those statutes with
regard to their object, and which is the next in importance to the
magnitude, and of almost equal concern in the inquiry into the justice
of these laws, is its possession. It is proper to recollect that this
religion, which is so persecuted in its members, is the old religion of
the country, and the once established religion of the state,--the very
same which had for centuries received the countenance and sanction of
the laws, and from which it would at one time have been highly penal to
have dissented. In proportion as mankind has become enlightened, the
idea of religious persecution, under any circumstances, has been almost
universally exploded by all good and thinking men. The only faint shadow
of difficulty which remains is concerning the introduction of new
opinions. Experience has shown, that, if it has been favorable to the
cause of truth, it has not been always conducive to the peace of
society. Though a new religious sect should even be totally free in
itself from any tumultuous and disorderl