barter away the most precious jewel of their souls.
Our Constitution is not made for this kind of warfare. It provides
greatly for our happiness, it furnishes few means for our defence. It
is formed, in a great measure, upon the principle of jealousy of the
crown,--and as things stood, when it took that turn, with very great
reason. I go farther: it must keep alive some part of that fire of
jealousy eternally and chastely burning, or it cannot be the British
Constitution. At various periods we have had tyranny in this country,
more than enough. We have had rebellions with more or less
justification. Some of our kings have made adulterous connections
abroad, and trucked away for foreign gold the interests and glory of
their crown. But, before this time, our liberty has never been
corrupted. I mean to say, that it has never been debauched from its
domestic relations. To this time it has been English liberty, and
English liberty only. Our love of liberty and our love of our country
were not distinct things. Liberty is now, it seems, put upon a larger
and more liberal bottom. We are men,--and as men, undoubtedly, nothing
human is foreign to us. We cannot be too liberal in our general wishes
for the happiness of our kind. But in all questions on the mode of
procuring it for any particular community, we ought to be fearful of
admitting those who have no interest in it, or who have, perhaps, an
interest against it, into the consultation. Above all, we cannot be too
cautious in our communication with those who seek their happiness by
other roads than those of humanity, morals, and religion, and whose
liberty consists, and consists alone, in being free from those
restraints which are imposed by the virtues upon the passions.

When we invite danger from a confidence in defensive measures, we ought,
first of all, to be sure that it is a species of danger against which
any defensive measures that can be adopted will be sufficient. Next, we
ought to know that the spirit of our laws, or that our own dispositions,
which are stronger than laws, are susceptible of all those defensive
measures which the occasion may require. A third consideration is,
whether these measures will not bring more odium than strength to
government; and the last, whether the authority that makes them, in a
general corruption of manners and principles, can insure their
execution. Let no one argue, from the state of things, as he sees them
at present, concerning