ty? Could the members of one
Congress say to the members of another, because we do not choose to
exercise all the authority vested in us by the Constitution, therefore
you _shall_ not? This would have been a prohibition to do what the
Constitution gives power to do. Each successive Congress would still
have gone to the Constitution for its power, brushing away in its course
the cobwebs stretched across its path by the officiousness of an
impertinent predecessor. Again, the legislatures of Virginia and
Maryland, had no power to bind Congress, either by an express or an
implied pledge, never to abolish slavery in the District. Those
legislatures had no power to bind _themselves_ never to abolish slavery
within their own territories--the ceded parts included. Where then would
they get power to bind _another_ not to do what they had no power to
bind themselves not to do? If a legislature could not in this respect
control the successive legislatures of its own State, could it control
the successive Congresses of the United States?

But perhaps we shall be told, that the "implied faith" in the acts of
cession of Maryland and Virginia was _not_ that Congress should _never_
abolish slavery in the District, but that it should not do it until
_they_ had done it within their bounds! Verily this "faith" comes little
short of the faith of miracles! "A good rule that works both ways."
First, Maryland and Virginia have "good faith" that Congress will _not_
abolish until _they_ do; and then just as "good faith" that Congress
_will_ abolish _when_ they do! Excellently accommodated! Did those
States suppose that Congress would legislate over the national domain,
the common jurisdiction of _all_, for Maryland and Virginia alone? And
who, did they suppose, would be judges in the matter?--themselves
merely? or the whole Union?

This "good faith implied in the cession" is no longer of doubtful
interpretation. The principle at the bottom of it, when fairly stated,
is this:--That the Government of the United States are bound in "good
faith" to do in the District of Columbia, without demurring, just what
and when, Maryland and Virginia do in their own States. In short, that
the general government is eased of all the burdens of legislation within
its exclusive jurisdiction, save that of hiring a scrivener to copy off
the acts of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures as fast as they are
passed, and engross them, under the title of "Laws of the