blishment
of the rights of the House of Commons in regard to impeachment, the
expiration of the Licence Act, and, above all, the glorious statute of
Habeas Corpus, have therefore induced a modern writer of great eminence
to fix the year 1679 as the period at which our constitution had arrived
at its greatest theoretical perfection; but he owns, in a short note upon
the passage alluded to, that the times immediately following were times
of great practical oppression. What a field for meditation does this
short observation from such a man furnish! What reflections does it not
suggest to a thinking mind upon the inefficacy of human laws and the
imperfection of human constitutions! We are called from the
contemplation of the progress of our constitution, and our attention
fixed with the most minute accuracy to a particular point, when it is
said to have risen to its utmost perfection. Here we are, then, at the
best moment of the best constitution that ever human wisdom framed. What
follows? A tide of oppression and misery, not arising from external or
accidental causes, such as war, pestilence, or famine, nor even from any
such alteration of the laws as might be supposed to impair this boasted
perfection, but from a corrupt and wicked administration, which all the
so much admired checks of the constitution were not able to prevent. How
vain, then, how idle, how presumptuous is the opinion that laws can do
everything! and how weak and pernicious the maxim founded upon it, that
measures, not men, are to be attended to.

The first years of this reign, under the administration of Southampton
and Clarendon, form by far the least exceptionable part of it; and even
in this period the executions of Argyle and Vane and the whole conduct of
the Government with respect to church matters, both in England and in
Scotland, were gross instances of tyranny. With respect to the execution
of those who were accused of having been more immediately concerned in
the king's death, that of Scrope, who had come in upon the proclamation,
and of the military officers who had attended the trial, was a violation
of every principle of law and justice. But the fate of the others,
though highly dishonourable to Monk, whose whole power had arisen from
his zeal in their service, and the favour and confidence with which they
had rewarded him, and not, perhaps, very creditable to the nation, of
which many had applauded, more had supported, and almost