onious accord with
socialism. It is thus the sexual relations which present the greatest
difficulties in the social domain.

In spite of the considerable progress which has been accomplished, our
modern law is still based to a great extent on the barbarous principle
of the legal inequality of the sexes. The mind of man and that of
woman are no doubt of different quality; nevertheless, in a society
which does not possess asexual individuals like that of the ants and
bees, and in which the two sexes are compelled to work together
harmoniously for the social welfare, there is no reason to subordinate
one sex to the other. Man may have 130 or 150 grammes more brain
tissue than woman and be superior to her in his faculty of combination
and invention, but this is no reason why we should only accord his
wife and mother inferior social rights to his own. His bodily strength
will always protect him against the possible encroachments of woman.

A first postulate is, therefore, the equality of the two sexes before
the law. A second postulate consists in the emancipation of infancy,
in the sense that it should never be considered as an object of
possession or of exploitation, as was and is still so often the case.

These are the fundamental principles of a normal sexual law. In no
animal do we find the abuses which man is permitted to practice toward
his wife and children. Let us now pass on to special questions.

CIVIL LAW

The object of civil law is to regulate the relations of men to each
ether. Properly speaking it does not punish, that is to say, it
requires no expiation and is not concerned with crime. It seeks to
improve the social basis for mutual obligations and contracts.
Nevertheless, it borders on penal law as regards the question of
damages which one individual must pay another whom he has injured even
involuntarily, as well as by the coercive measures, both
administrative and operative, which it employs.

Although resting on a natural basis better adapted to the social
welfare than penal law, civil law still contains the traditions of
religious mysticism and the abuse of conventional right.

I shall here analyze in a few words what concerns our subject in
actual civil law, and shall point out the modifications which appear
to me desirable. It is, however, impossible for me to enter into the
details of codes, owing to absence of special knowledge. Moreover,
this would lead us too far from our subject.

=Mar