ning much. I shall return to this point in
connection with another subject, but I may remark here that it is not
the continuation of marriage nor that of sexual connection which
injures society, but only the procreation of children. Therefore it is
only the procreation of children, which should be legally prohibited,
and sexual connection only when the healthy conjoint agrees to its
suppression, or when the interests of the afflicted one necessitate
it.

In the future these particular cases may be regulated in the most
convenient and humane way possible.

Certain bodily infirmities which one of the conjoints has concealed
from the other, or of which he was not himself aware, should also
impair the validity of the marriage contract. Such are chronic
infectious diseases, especially venereal, impotence in the man and
sterility in the woman, when the cause was previously known. But here
again, the law should only intervene at the request of the person
injured, and to take certain measures to prevent the procreation of
abortions, without interfering with sexual connection.

=Adultery.=--An important question is that of adultery. Here again, we
are of opinion that the law has not performed its duty. Proved
adultery, when fidelity has been promised by contract should give the
injured party the right of immediate and absolute divorce.

Certain forms of adultery, which take place with the assent of the two
conjoints, have in reality the character of bigamy and should neither
be recognized by civil nor penal law. I will cite as an example, the
case where two conjoints wish to live together for various reasons,
while the impotence, disease or sterility of one of them induces him
to concede to the other liberty of sexual connection with a third
person, apart from marriage. In such a case neither society nor any
one else is injured and all motive for legal intervention is wanting
(vide Andre Couvreur: _La Graine_).

=Divorce.=--The question of divorce becomes extremely difficult when
one of the conjoints wishes for it and the other does not, and when no
other reason exists for determining the marriage. We are here
concerned with the malicious caprices of the god of love, from which
the world will never be free.

In my opinion, the law in such cases can only do one thing, and that
is to protect the rights of the children, if there are any, and to
compel the inconstant conjoint to provide for their nourishment.

The law shoul