or at
least concerning ourselves with them only as far as they are useful to
us.

Further, we have seen that it is very difficult to extend the
conception of social welfare to all the living races of humanity, for
some of them are at the same time so fecund and so inferior in
quality, that if they were allowed to multiply around us without any
precaution they would soon starve and supplant us. Then the barbarity
of their lower instincts (vide weight of brain in different races at
end of Chapter VI) would soon take the upper hand and become general,
as the negroes of Hayti have shown us by a lesson which is worthy of
our attention.

Therefore, an exaggeration of moral sentiments, resting on a false
basis, would have the positive result of striking a fatal blow at our
social morality, slowly built up during hundreds or thousands of
years.

Lastly, the same action may first of all do evil and afterwards good,
for example, a painful lesson; or _vice versa_, as in the satisfaction
of a gluttonous appetite.

=Morality can only be Relative.=--It follows from these considerations
that our moral duties can only be relative, and cannot bind us in the
same way nor in the same degree to all living beings, not even to all
men, if we would avoid sacrificing what is lofty to what is vile. In
theory, the definition of human morality will consist in a just and
scientific definition of social welfare and the exigencies which it
imposes on individuals, in order that the latter do not do evil in
attempting to do good. In practice, it will be the general effort made
to develop successfully this social welfare by the aid of individual
will. This presupposes in the first place education of the will, the
dispositions to useful work, and the altruistic sentiments of each
individual. It is neither theoretical dogma nor preaching, but action
and example which make for the education of man.

The noblest task of moral action is to strive for the welfare of
future generations.

=Altruism and Egoism.=--Properly understood, altruism and egoism do
not form an antinomy, or only quite a relative antinomy. It is
absolutely wrong to found social order by letting loose all our
egoistic appetites without restriction. But it is quite as wrong to
oppose them with an exaggerated and unnatural asceticism, which
reflects in our eyes an erroneous ideal of altruism.

When a bee or an ant disgorges the honey from its stomach for the
benefit of its compan