t of the
infantry is uncertain; but the knowledge which both ancient and modern
times supply of the usual character of oriental armies, and of their
populations of camp-followers, may warrant us in believing that many
myriads were prepared to fight or to encumber those who fought for the
last Darius.
The position of the Persian King near Mesopotamia was chosen with great
military skill. It was certain that Alexander, on his return from Egypt,
must march northward along the Syrian coast before he attacked the
central provinces of the Persian empire. A direct eastward march from
the lower part of Palestine across the great Syrian Desert was then, as
ever, utterly impracticable. Marching eastward from Syria, Alexander
would, on crossing the Euphrates, arrive at the vast Mesopotamian
plains. The wealthy capitals of the empire, Babylon, Susa, and
Persepolis, would then lie to the south; and if he marched down through
Mesopotamia to attack them, Darius might reasonably hope to follow the
Macedonians with his immense force of cavalry, and, without even risking
a pitched battle, to harass and finally overwhelm them.
We may remember that three centuries afterward a Roman army under
Crassus was thus actually destroyed by the oriental archers and horsemen
in these very plains, and that the ancestors of the Parthians who thus
vanquished the Roman legions served by thousands under King Darius. If,
on the contrary, Alexander should defer his march against Babylon, and
first seek an encounter with the Persian army, the country on each side
of the Tigris in this latitude was highly advantageous for such an army
as Darius commanded, and he had close in his rear the mountainous
districts of Northern Media, where he himself had in early life been
satrap, where he had acquired reputation as a soldier and a general, and
where he justly expected to find loyalty to his person, and a safe
refuge in case of defeat.[49]
[Footnote 49: Mitford's remarks on the strategy of Darius in his last
campaign are very just. After having been unduly admired as a historian,
Mitford is now unduly neglected. His partiality and his deficiency in
scholarship have been exposed sufficiently to make him no longer a
dangerous guide as to Greek politics, while the clearness and brilliance
of his narrative, and the strong common sense of his remarks (where his
party prejudices do not interfere), must always make his volumes
valuable as well as entertaining.]
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