ation. But
I must not regard myself, but my people and the other men who must
fight.
I assure you that our position is serious, and when I lay matters bare
to you, I do not do so to discourage you, but to give you a clear
insight into them, as it is my duty to do, because you must take a
very important decision here. I have always thought that when matters
came to such a pass with us, that we were driven by hunger to
surrender we should, before going under, and while we were still a
nation, accept terms. We cannot wait until our numbers are reduced to
a few thousand men and then try to negotiate. It would then be too
late. If we wish to negotiate, now is the time. If the Lord God wills
it, then, however bitter, we must come to terms. We cannot simply go
on blindly and say that we trust in God. Miracles can happen, but it
is not for me or for you to say what God's will is with us, or that
the Lord will allow us to retain our independence. If we proceed, it
will be a bitter cup for us to see that the one commando after the
other is forced to surrender. Our responsibility will only be the
greater if we go on and ultimately yet lose. We hear continually of
the death of this one or that one, and it is asked who will care for
the widows if we make peace now? But does not this question remain if
we prosecute the war?
If we have to give up eleven districts--and that means the half of the
South African Republic--then as far as I can see the war must end
disastrously for our people. If a great victory is gained over us we
shall not be able to stand it. All will immediately be over with us.
There is a military reason why we have been able to carry on such a
great war for such a long time against such overwhelming forces, and
that is, because we have commandos in each district, which compels the
British to divide their forces. But if we abandon eleven districts, as
we shall have to do shortly, that will mean the concentration of our
forces, which will give the enemy an opportunity of concentrating
their troops against us, and the consequences thereof will be fatal
for us.
In only one portion of our country, namely, in Zoutpansberg, is there
still food, but how do we obtain our provisions there? It must be
taken, and thereby we create more enemies. Our safety in Zoutpansberg
lay in this: that hitherto the Kaffirs were divided, but if the enemy
were to pour into that district the Kaffirs will join them against us.
I therefore
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