power and authority
may not be well founded, but not as if they had a right to claim it,
but merely because of the giving of it being in itself right. The oath
may be sworn for a proper purpose before an individual who has correct
impressions of its sacredness, even though he may be acting for an
unwarranted civil authority. It is not easy to conceive, however, how
one could swear an oath to an infidel, or to any other who regards not
the oath as a solemn religious engagement. The giving of an oath before
a judge and jury, or on a jury before a judge, under an unscriptural
government, does not include the recognition of those as using a power
deputed by God; but contemplates them as Christian men, though mistaken
as to their power, yet doing what is in itself right, and which, if done
by those possessed of authority from God, would be done in all things,
though imperfectly, according to his will. To swear to do justice, is
not to swear an oath of allegiance to an evil power. The one is a duty;
the other would be sinful. It is because that no better means of doing
justice can be employed, that oaths to do justice in the said
circumstances should be given. For the assumption of power which does
not belong to them, those who make it, but not those who even make oath
before them to do what is in itself good, while they protest against
their unlawful claims to authority, are responsible.

A civil government must either be the ordinance of God or not. It cannot
be viewed as acting, in some things, in the character of a power
ordained of God, but in others, as not possessed of authority from him.
A good government, like a true Christian, often does what is evil. But a
bad government, like the wicked, even though it do what in itself is
right, cannot be viewed as in possession of privilege from God, or as
acting for his glory. Yet the inflicting of a just penalty, even by an
unwarranted power, is not to be reckoned as injustice, or--if a capital
punishment, as murder. It is the claim to power which is made, but not
the accomplishment of the deed of retribution--which in itself is just,
that is faulty. Take for example the execution of justice on a murderer.
Murder is not the crime to be laid to the charge of those who, acting
for or under the authority of a power that is not of God, on proper
evidence put to death one who has unjustly taken away the life of a
fellow creature. If a government not authorised by God, after due
in