to possession, the usurpation of royal prerogatives, in
the course of years, by a degraded and servile people, may be not merely
submitted to, but acknowledged as lawful; yet, as the thief or the
robber, though his heirs to the third and fourth generation may possess
the fruits of his spoil, cannot fail to stand chargeable with crime
before God's throne, so the ruler, whose throne is founded on iniquity,
or ascended through cruelty or injustice, though millions applaud his
government and confirm to his descendants the power that may be unjustly
claimed by him, cannot, but in the eye of the Eternal, be viewed as a
usurper. And concerning those who submit willingly to his authority, the
Lord will say, "They set up kings, but not by me; they have made
princes, and I knew it not."[272] Next, as to the obedience which a
people owe to their civil rulers. The nature and extent thereof are
defined in the word of God. To the law of God, all mankind are under
permanent obligations; and all, in their peculiar relations, are bound
to render obedience to those rulers who are vested with authority from
Him. Between rulers and the people under them, the compact ought to be
mutual and voluntary; and wherever a just title to sovereign power can
be shown, there obedience can be claimed. For the government of mankind
in things civil, God has been pleased to appoint the ordinance of
magistracy; and He himself, in his providence, calls to the exercise of
its supreme and subordinate functions. This call is addressed through
the people, who alone possess the right to raise to power and trust over
them those possessed of qualifications for office. When the attainments
of those chosen to rule accord in some measure with the requirements of
the Divine law, the power communicated is of Divine authority, and
obedience as unto God is due by the people; but when the compact between
the ruler and the people is opposed to the doctrines of Divine truth,
there is no obligation upon either party. Both are chargeable with sin
for entering into their engagements; but the people are free from their
promised allegiance, and the ruler is destitute of authority. This we
may say in general, without condescending upon the precise limits,
transgressing which, power on the one hand is null and void, and
obedience on the other is not obligatory; or, inquiring what in systems
of government, partly good and partly evil, is essential to their
authority. We can conceive