ention of sending to France more troops than
would be needed to keep filled the ranks of the small expeditionary
force. But the urgent representations of the Allies and reports from
American officers induced a radical change in policy. The latter
emphasized the unsound military position of our Allies and insisted that
the deadlock could be broken and the war won only by putting a really
effective American army beside the French and British by the summer of
1918. A programme was drawn up in France and sent to the War Department,
according to which an army of thirty divisions should be sent abroad
before the end of that year. Throughout 1917 this plan remained rather a
hope than a definite programme and it was not until early in 1918 that it
was officially approved. It was thus of an emergency character and this
fact combined with the indefiniteness prevalent during the autumn of 1917
to produce extreme confusion. In July, 1918, an eighty-division programme
was adopted and more confusion resulted. Furthermore the entire problem
was complicated by the question as to whether or not ships could be found
for transportation. It had been assumed that it would take six months to
transport five hundred thousand troops. But in May, 1918, and thereafter
nearly three hundred thousand troops a month were carried to France,
largely through tonnage obtained from the British. Such a development of
transportation facilities was not and could not be foreseen. It increased
the confusion. In the face of such difficulties, the problems of
man-power, training, and supplies had to be met and ultimately solved,
largely through the centralization carried into effect by the General
Staff.

The problem of man-power had been carefully considered during the weeks
that preceded our entrance into the war and the declaration of war found
the Government prepared with a plan for a selective draft. On the 7th of
April, the day after the declaration of war, President Wilson insisted
that "the safety of the nation depended upon the measure."

Congress, however, was slow to accept the principle of conscription, and
the President encountered fierce opposition on the part of the advocates
of the volunteer system, who were led by men of such influence as Speaker
Champ Clark, House Leader Claude Kitchin, and the chairman of the House
Committee on Military Affairs, Stanley H. Dent. The President was
inflexible, declaring that the Administration would not "yield a