and classes were gathered in, representing at least fifty-six
different nationalities; artisans, millionaires, and hoboes bunked side by
side; the youthful plutocrat saw life from a new angle, the wild
mountaineer learned to read, the alien immigrant to speak English. Finally
the purpose of the training was achieved, for America sent over a force
that could fight successfully at the moment of crisis.
Amateur critics had assumed that the problem of raising an effective
number of troops would prove far more difficult than that of producing
the necessary equipment and munitions. It was generally believed that the
industrial genius of America was such that American factories could
provide all the artillery, small-arms, and aircraft that the armies could
use. The most fantastic prophecies were indulged in. Experience showed,
however, that it is easier to raise, train, and organize troops of
superior sort in a brief period than it is to arm them. It stands as a
matter of record that foreign artillery and machine guns alone made
possible the attack on the St. Mihiel salient and the advance in the
Argonne. As for military airplanes, had the Government relied upon those
of American manufacture there would have been no American squadrons
flying over the German lines previous to August, 1918, and not many
between then and the signing of the armistice.
Such a statement should not imply blanket criticism of the Ordnance
Department. The Government was perhaps slow, even after the United States
entered the war, to realize the serious character of the military
situation abroad and to appreciate the extent to which American aid would
be necessary to allied victory. Hence the changes in the military
programme which inevitably created confusion. But the decision to ensure
against unforeseen disaster by preparing heavily for 1919 and 1920 and
partially disregarding 1918 was based upon sound strategical reasoning.
The war was brought to a close sooner than had been expected; hence the
period of actual hostilities was devoted to laying down the foundations
of a munitions industry, and the munitions actually produced, in the
words of Assistant Secretary Crowell, "might almost be termed casual to
the main enterprise, pilots of the quantities to come." Such a policy was
possible because of the surplus production of the Allies. The latter
stated that their production of artillery was such that they could equip
all American divisions as they ar
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