as any measure by which a State could defeat the laws
of the Union." In a minority report from his own committee he strongly
censured the policy of the Administration. He was for meeting,
fighting out, and determining at this crisis the whole doctrine of
state rights and secession. "One particle of compromise," he said,
with what truth events have since shown clearly enough, would
"directly lead to the final and irretrievable dissolution of the
Union." In his usual strong and thorough-going fashion he was for (p. 236)
persisting in the vigorous and spirited measures, the mere brief
declaration of which, though so quickly receded from, won for Jackson
a measure of credit greater than he deserved. Jackson was thrown into
a great rage by the threats of South Carolina, and replied to them
with the same prompt wrath with which he had sometimes resented
insults from individuals. But in his cool inner mind he was in
sympathy with the demands which that State preferred, and though
undoubtedly he would have fought her, had the dispute been forced to
that pass, yet he was quite willing to make concessions, which were in
fact in consonance with his own views as well as with hers, in order
to avoid that sad conclusion. He was satisfied to have the instant
emergency pass over in a manner rendered superficially creditable to
himself by his outburst of temper, under cover of which he sacrificed
the substantial matter of principle without a qualm. He shook his fist
and shouted defiance in the face of the nullifiers, while Mr. Clay
smuggled a comfortable concession into their pockets. Jackson,
notwithstanding his belligerent attitude, did all he could to help
Clay and was well pleased with the result. Mr. Adams was not. He
watched the disingenuous game with disgust. It is certain that if he
had still been in the White House, the matter would have had a (p. 237)
very different ending, bloodier, it may be, and more painful, but
much more conclusive.

For the most part Mr. Adams found himself in opposition to President
Jackson's Administration. This was not attributable to any sense of
personal hostility towards a successful rival, but to an inevitable
antipathy towards the measures, methods, and ways adopted by the
General so unfortunately transferred to civil life. Few intelligent
persons, and none having the statesman habit of mind, befriended the
reckless, violent, eminently unstatesmanlike President. His ultimate
weakness in the