arrived more or
less intact, and went into action in the Jordan Valley, where they were so
badly mauled by the Australians that the fragments that remained bolted
incontinently, and for the future stayed behind the line. In August the
R.A.F., in conjunction with the forces of the King of the Hedjaz, who were
working their way northwards across the desert east of Amman, made an
attack on the Hedjaz railway at Der'aa, at which place the line was
completely demolished and all communication severed with the north.
In single combats, too, our airmen now more than held their own, for the
Turkish planes either fled at first sight or, if they stayed to argue the
point, were generally brought down. From the Camel Camp on the hill
overlooking General Allenby's Headquarters at Bir Salem we saw several
battles in the air, for G.H.Q. was a favourite mark of the Turks, and these
almost invariably went in favour of the British.
By the end of August the intensive training of the new troops and the work
of re-organisation were complete; and it is interesting to note, as an
indication of the way in which the army had been for the most part, made
"on the premises," as it were, that it comprised British, French, Italian,
Jewish, West Indian, Arab, Indian, Algerian, Armenian, and Egyptian troops,
to say nothing of the tribes of mixed race but Mahommedan faith who
assisted the King of the Hedjaz in the final struggle.
At this stage a word as to the disposition of the Turkish forces is
necessary: their main position was at Nablus, (the ancient Shechem), which
was well protected naturally by Mt. Gerizim in the south and Mt. Ebal in
the north, and had been fortified with German thoroughness and ingenuity
during the summer months. From here the line extended in a south-westerly
direction towards the sea, including _en route_ another immensely strong
position at Jiljulieh, immediately to the north of which was the village of
Kalkilieh, also well fortified; another Turkish force operated west and
east of the Jordan.
A frontal attack on Nablus was out of the question; an army of goats might
have successfully scaled the mountains of Samaria, but it was no place for
troops; nor was the Jordan Valley any more inviting. The best chance of
success lay in the coastal sector, where the conformation of the ground was
not so much in favour of the Turks, and it was decided that our main attack
should be made here. The plan was for the infantry to make
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