ons of our muscles or ideas may be produced in
consequence of desire or aversion without our having the power to prevent
them, and yet these motions may be termed voluntary, according to our
definition of the word; though in common language they would be called
involuntary.

The objects of desire and aversion are generally at a distance, whereas
those of pleasure and pain are immediately acting upon our organs. Hence,
before desire or aversion are exerted, so as to cause any actions, there is
generally time for deliberation; which consists in discovering the means to
obtain the object of desire, or to avoid the object of aversion; or in
examining the good or bad consequences, which may result from them. In this
case it is evident, that we have a power to delay the proposed action, or
to perform it; and this power of choosing, whether we shall act or not, is
in common language expressed by the word volition, or will. Whereas in this
work the word volition means simply the active state of the sensorial
faculty in producing motion in consequence of desire or aversion: whether
we have the power of restraining that action, or not; that is, whether we
exert any actions in consequence of opposite desires or aversions, or not.

For if the objects of desire or aversion are present, there is no necessity
to investigate or compare the _means_ of obtaining them, nor do we always
deliberate about their consequences; that is, no deliberation necessarily
intervenes, and in consequence the power of choosing to act or not is not
exerted. It is probable, that this twofold use of the word volition in all
languages has confounded the metaphysicians, who have disputed about free
will and necessity. Whereas from the above analysis it would appear, that
during our sleep, we use no voluntary exertions at all; and in our waking
hours, that they are the consequence of desire or aversion.

To will is to act in consequence of desire; but to desire means to desire
something, even if that something be only to become free from the pain,
which causes the desire; for to desire nothing is not to desire; the word
desire, therefore, includes both the action and the object or motive; for
the object and motive of desire are the same thing. Hence to desire without
an object, that is, without a motive, is a solecism in language. As if one
should ask, if you could eat without food, or breathe without air.

From this account of volition it appears, that convul