ose he acquires vicious habits and incurable indolence or
total neglect of the duties of his office, which shall work mischief to
the public welfare; is there no way to arrest the threatened danger?
Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular by reason of the measures he
pursues--and this he may do without committing any positive offense
against the law; must he preserve his office in despite of the popular
will? Suppose him grasping for his own aggrandizement and the elevation
of his connections by every means short of the treason defined by the
Constitution, hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction,
endangering your domestic tranquillity, plundering you of the means of
defense, alienating the affections of your allies and promoting the
spirit of discord; must the tardy, tedious, desultory road by way of
impeachment be traveled to overtake the man who, barely confining
himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off the
vital principle of the Government? The nature of things, the great
objects of society, the express objects of the Constitution itself,
require that this thing should be otherwise. To unite the Senate with
the President in the exercise of the power," it was said, "would involve
us in the most serious difficulty. Suppose a discovery of any of those
events should take place when the Senate is not in session; how is the
remedy to be applied? The evil could be avoided in no other way than by
the Senate sitting always." In regard to the danger of the power being
abused if exercised by one man it was said "that the danger is as great
with respect to the Senate, who are assembled from various parts of the
continent, with different impressions and opinions;" "that such a body
is more likely to misuse the power of removal than the man whom the
united voice of America calls to the Presidential chair. As the nature
of government requires the power of removal," it was maintained "that it
should be exercised in this way by the hand capable of exerting itself
with effect; and the power must be conferred on the President by the
Constitution as the executive officer of the Government."
Mr. Madison, whose adverse opinion in the Federalist had been relied
upon by those who denied the exclusive power, now participated in the
debate. He declared that he had reviewed his former opinions, and he
summed up the whole case as follows:
The Constitution affirms that the executive power is vested in th
|