tion of
the one is the destruction of the other; the preservation of the one is
the preservation of the other.

I have thus explained my views of the mutual relations of the
Constitution and the States, because they unfold the principles on
which I have sought to solve the momentous questions and overcome the
appalling difficulties that met me at the very commencement of my
Administration. It has been my steadfast object to escape from the
sway of momentary passions and to derive a healing policy from the
fundamental and unchanging principles of the Constitution.

I found the States suffering from the effects of a civil war. Resistance
to the General Government appeared to have exhausted itself. The United
States had recovered possession of their forts and arsenals, and their
armies were in the occupation of every State which had attempted to
secede. Whether the territory within the limits of those States should
be held as conquered territory, under military authority emanating from
the President as the head of the Army, was the first question that
presented itself for decision.

Now military governments, established for an indefinite period, would
have offered no security for the early suppression of discontent, would
have divided the people into the vanquishers and the vanquished, and
would have envenomed hatred rather than have restored affection. Once
established, no precise limit to their continuance was conceivable. They
would have occasioned an incalculable and exhausting expense. Peaceful
emigration to and from that portion of the country is one of the best
means that can be thought of for the restoration of harmony, and that
emigration would have been prevented; for what emigrant from abroad,
what industrious citizen at home, would place himself willingly under
military rule? The chief persons who would have followed in the train of
the Army would have been dependents on the General Government or men who
expected profit from the miseries of their erring fellow-citizens. The
powers of patronage and rule which would have been exercised, under the
President, over a vast and populous and naturally wealthy region are
greater than, unless under extreme necessity, I should be willing to
intrust to any one man. They are such as, for myself, I could never,
unless on occasions of great emergency, consent to exercise. The willful
use of such powers, if continued through a period of years, would have
endangered the puri