opinion formed
as aforesaid that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not
affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief
of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be
responsible for the said Stanton in the said office of Secretary for the
Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might
in the judgment of the President be lawful and necessary to raise for a
judicial decision the questions affecting the lawful right of the said
Stanton to resume the said office or the power of the said Stanton to
persist in refusing to quit the said office if he should persist in
actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end
only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the
order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article
mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing the said Lorenzo
Thomas to act as Secretary of War _ad interim_, in the said second
article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial
allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said
Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession
of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies
that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled
to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United
States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said
Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that the said order was issued
with intent to violate the act entitled "An act regulating the tenure of
certain civil offices." He denies that the said order was a violation of
the last-mentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of
the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his
oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent
to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or
this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully but earnestly
insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he
believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of
what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an
imperative official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive
matters in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the
same are therein stated and set f