e, the distance between them is marked out by the
number of interjacent visible points; if they are tangible,
the distance between, them is a line consisting of tangible
points."
Again, there are two sorts of magnitude or extension:--
"It has been shown that there are two sorts of objects
apprehended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magnitude
or extension: the one properly tangible, _i.e._ to be
perceived and measured by touch, and not immediately falling
under the sense of seeing; the other properly and immediately
visible, by mediation of which the former is brought into
view."--Sec. 55.
But how are we to reconcile these passages with others which will be
perfectly familiar to every reader of the "New Theory of Vision "? As,
for example:--
"It is, I think, agreed by all, that distance of itself, and
immediately, cannot be seen."--Sec. 2.
"Space or distance, we have shown, is no otherwise the object
of sight than of hearing."--Sec. 130.
"Distance is in its own nature imperceptible, and yet it is
perceived by sight. It remains, therefore, that it is
brought into view by means of some other idea, that is itself
immediately perceived in the act of vision."--Sec. 11.
"Distance or external space."--Sec. 155.
The explanation is quite simple, and lies in the fact that Berkeley
uses the word "distance" in three senses. Sometimes he employs it to
denote visible distance, and then he restricts it to distance in two
dimensions, or simple extension. Sometimes he means tangible distance
in two dimensions; but most commonly he intends to signify tangible
distance in the third dimension. And it is in this sense that he
employs "distance" as the equivalent of "space." Distance in two
dimensions is, for Berkeley, not space, but extension. By taking a
pencil and interpolating the words "visible" and "tangible" before
"distance" wherever the context renders them necessary, Berkeley's
statements may be made perfectly consistent; though he has not always
extricated himself from the entanglement caused by his own loose
phraseology, which rises to a climax in the last ten sections of
the "Theory of Vision," in which he endeavours to prove that a pure
intelligence able to see, but devoid of the sense of touch, could have
no idea of a plane figure. Thus he says in section 156:--
"All that is properly perceived by the visual faculty amoun
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