aggregations, according to the laws of the association of
sensible perceptions.--Association.
"The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations,
consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere _presentative_
sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or
_representative_ faculty. Such actions minister to and form
_Instinct_. Besides these, we may distinguish two other kinds
of mental action, namely:--
"V. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are
reflected on by thought, and recognized as our own, and
we ourselves recognized by ourselves as affected and
perceiving.--Self-consciousness.
"VI. That in which we reflect upon our sensations or
perceptions, and ask what they are, and why they are.--Reason.
"These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations,
performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas
implying the use of a _reflective representative_ faculty.
Such actions distinguish the _intellect_ or rational faculty.
Now, we assert that possession in perfection of all the first
four _(presentative)_ kinds of action by no means implies
the possession of the last two _(representative)_ kinds.
All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following
proposition:--
"Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but _in kind_,
if we may possess the one in perfection without that fact
implying that we possess the other also. Still more will
this be the case if the two faculties tend to increase in
an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction between the
_instinctive_ and the _intellectual_ parts of man's nature.
"As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the
first four groups of actions--that they may have, so to speak,
mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of
complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny to
them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two
kinds of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of
reflecting on their own existence, or of inquiring into the
nature of objects and their causes. We deny that they know
that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other words,
we deny them _reason_. The possession of the presentative
faculty, as above explained, in no way implies that of the
reflective faculty; nor does any amount of dir
|