ew of the forbearance and kindness he was personally exercising
towards the unruly elements of his faction. Throughout the Northern
States the folly and evils of disunion appeared so palpable that it was
not generally regarded as an imminent danger, but rather as merely a
possible though not probable event. The hasty and seemingly earnest
action of the people and authorities of South Carolina was looked upon
as a historical repetition of the nullification crisis of 1831-32; and
without examining too closely the real present condition of affairs,
men hoped, rather than intelligently expected, that the parallel would
continue to the end. Some sort of compromise of the nature of that of
1850 was the prevailing preoccupation in politics.

This was the popular view of the situation. But it was an erroneous
view, because it lacked the essential information necessary to form a
correct and solid judgment. The deep estrangement between the sections
was imperfectly realized. The existence of four parties, a very unusual
occurrence in American politics, had seriously weakened party cohesion,
and more than quadrupled party prejudice and mistrust. There was a
strong undercurrent of conviction and purpose, not expressed in
speeches and platforms. But the most serious ignorance was in respect
to the character and fidelity of the high officers of the Government.
Of the timidity of Mr. Buchanan, of the treachery of three members of
the Cabinet, of the exclusion of General Scott from military councils,
of the President's refusal to send troops to Anderson, of his
stipulation with the South Carolina Members, of the intrigue which
drove General Cass from the head of the State Department and from the
Cabinet, the people at large knew nothing, or so little that they could
put no intelligent construction upon the events. The debates of
Congress shed the first clear light upon the situation, but the very
violence and bitterness of the secession speeches caused the multitude
to doubt their sincerity, or placed their authors in the category of
fanatics who would gain no followers.

While, therefore, the Republicans in Congress and in the country
maintained, as a rule, an expectant and watchful silence, the
conservatives, made up for the greater part of the supporters of Bell
and Everett, were active in setting on foot a movement for compromise,
in the final success of which they had the fullest confidence; and it
is but justice to their integri