c services, and of higher estimation
than these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and such-like habits, or
whether they possess only bodily qualities: each side of the question
has its difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein do
they differ from freemen? and that they do not, since they are men,
and partakers of reason, is absurd. Nearly the same inquiry may be made
concerning a woman and a child, whether these also have their proper
virtues; whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and
whether a child is temperate or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be
general, whether the virtues of those who, by nature, either govern or
are governed, are the same or different; for if it is necessary that
both of them should partake of the fair and good, why is it also
necessary that, without exception, the one should govern, the other
always be governed? for this cannot arise from their possessing these
qualities in different degrees; for to govern, and to be governed, are
things different in species, but more or less are not. And yet it is
wonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if
he who is to govern should not be temperate and just, how can he govern
well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he
who is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will never do what he ought: it
is evident then that both parties ought to be virtuous; but there is a
difference between them, as there is between those who by nature command
and who by nature obey, and this originates in the soul; for in this
nature has planted the governing and submitting principle, the virtues
of which we say are different, as are those of a rational and an
irrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be
extended farther, and that there are in nature a variety of things which
govern and are governed; for a freeman is governed in a different manner
from a slave, a male from a female, and a man from a child: and all
these have parts of mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus
a slave can have no power of determination, a woman but a weak one, a
child an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to
moral virtues; all must be supposed to possess them, but not in the
same manner, but as is best suited to every one's employment; on which
account he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his
business is entirely that of an architect, and