tamford Raffles to secure
such a supremely important roadstead as that of Singapore for the empire.
Although, therefore, the relative values of positions was not always
recognized, Great Britain obtained as a legacy from sailing days a large
number of harbours admirably adapted for use as coaling stations. Since
the dawn of the era of steam, she has acquired Aden, Perim, Hong-Kong,
North Borneo, Fiji, part of New Guinea, Fanning Island, and many other
islands in the Pacific, while the striking development of Australia and
New Zealand has added to the long roll of British ports. The coaling
stations, actual and potential, of the empire are unrivalled in number,
in convenience of geographical distribution, and in resources. Of the
numerous British ports abroad which contained coal stores, only the four
so-called "fortresses"--Gibraltar, Malta, Halifax and Bermuda--were at
first fortified as naval stations after the introduction of rifled
ordnance. The term fortress is a misnomer in every case except Gibraltar,
which, being a peninsula separated only by a neck of neutral ground from
the territory of a foreign power, exists under fortress conditions. Large
sums were expended on these places with little regard to principles, and
the defences of Bermuda, which were very slowly constructed, are
monuments of misapplied ingenuity.

Carnarvon Commission.

In 1878 great alarm arose from strained relations with Russia. Rumours
of the presence of Russian cruisers in many waters, and of hostile
projects, were readily believed, although the Russian navy, which had
just shown itself unable to face that of Turkey, would at this period
have been practically powerless. Widespread fears for the security of
coaling stations led to the appointment of a strong royal commission,
under the presidency of the earl of Carnarvon, which was instructed to
inquire into and report upon the protection of British commerce at sea.
This was the first attempt to formulate any principles, or to determine
which of the many ports where coal was stored should be treated as
coaling stations essential for the purposes of war. The terms of the
reference to the commission were ill-conceived. The basis of all defence
of sea-borne commerce is a mobile navy. It is the movement of commerce
upon the sea during war, not its security in port, that is essential to
the British empire, and a navy able to protect commerce at sea must
evidently protect ports and coaling s