send ships to Bombay. In
this case a distant harbour acquired strategic importance, mainly
because sheltered waters, in the seas where Hughes and Suffren strove
for naval supremacy, were few and far between. A sailing man-of-war
usually carried from five to six months' provisions and water for 100 to
120 days. Other needs required to be met, and during the wars of the
French Revolution it was usual, when possible, to allow ships engaged in
blockade to return to port every five or six weeks "to refresh." For a
sailing fleet acting on the offensive, a port from which it could easily
get to sea was a great advantage. Thus Raleigh protested against the use
of closely landlocked harbours. "Certain it is," he wrote, "that these
ships are purposely to serve His Majesty and to defend the kingdom from
danger, and not to be so penned up from casualitie as that they should
be less able or serviceable in times of need." Nelson for this reason
made great use of Maddalena Bay, in Sardinia, and was not greatly
impressed with the strategic value of Malta in spite of its fine natural
harbour. The introduction of steam gave rise to a new naval
requirement--coal--which soon became vital. Commerce under steam quickly
settled down upon fixed routes, and depots of coal were established to
meet its needs. Coaling stations thus came into existence by a natural
process, arising from the exigencies of trade, and began later to supply
the needs of navies.

British coaling stations.

For many years there was no inquiry into the war requirements of the
British fleet as regards coal, and no attempt to regularize or to fortify
the ports at which it was stored. Successful naval war had won for Great
Britain many points of vantage throughout the world, and in some cases
the strategic value of ports had been proved by actual experience. The
extreme importance of the Cape of Good Hope, obscured for a time after
the opening of the Suez Canal, was fully realized in sailing days, and
the naval conditions of those days to some extent determined the choice
of islands and harbours for occupation. There does not, however, appear
to have been any careful study of relative strategic values. Treaties
were occasionally drafted by persons whose geographical knowledge was at
fault, and positions were, in some cases, abandoned which ought to have
been retained, or tenaciously held when they might have been abandoned.
It was left to the personal exertions of Sir S