, to the varying political conditions of the
time. Of this balance of power, as recognized and defined in the Treaty
of Utrecht and its successors, England became the special guardian. Her
insular position made her almost the one great state which could have no
dreams of continental aggrandizement; while the main aim of her policy,
that of guarding the throne of the Revolution, secured her fidelity to
the European settlement which offered an insuperable obstacle to a
Jacobite invasion. Her only interest lay in the maintenance of European
peace on the basis of an observance of European treaties.

[Sidenote: Its results.]

Nothing is at first sight more wearisome than the long line of
alliances, triple and quadruple, the endless negotiations, the
interminable congresses, the innumerable treaties, which make up the
history of Europe during the earlier half of the eighteenth century; nor
is it easy to follow with patience the meddlesome activity of English
diplomacy during that period, its protests and interventions, its
subsidies and guarantees, its intrigues and finessings, its bluster and
its lies. But wearisome as it all is, it succeeded in its end, and its
end was a noble one. Of the twenty-five years between the Revolution and
the Peace of Utrecht all but five were years of war, and the five were a
mere breathing-space in which the combatants on either side were girding
themselves for fresh hostilities. That the twenty-five years which
followed were for Europe as a whole a time of peace was due in great
measure to the zeal with which England watched over the settlement that
had been brought about at Utrecht. To a great extent her efforts averted
war altogether; and when war could not be averted she brought it within
as narrow limits and to as speedy an end as was possible. Diplomacy
spent its ingenuity in countless choppings and changings of the smaller
territories about the Mediterranean and elsewhere; but till the rise of
Prussia under Frederick the Great it secured Europe as a whole from any
world-wide struggle. Nor was this maintenance of European peace all the
gain which the attitude of England brought with it. The stubborn policy
of the Georgian statesmen has left its mark on our policy ever since. In
struggling for peace and for the sanctity of treaties, even though the
struggle was one of selfish interest, England took a ply which she has
never wholly lost. Warlike and imperious as is her national temper, she