mpaired by deference to the
representatives of the people. The language is, for the nineteenth century,
indefensible. Taken in connexion with the general argument, it resolves
itself into a courtly seventeenth century solace to the monarch for an
obligatory return to Parliamentary government.

[Sidenote: _Not shared by James._]

For the second quotation such an excuse is scarcely requisite. The
theories of the royal prerogative in France and in England were not
originally dissimilar, profoundly unlike as was the practice. Since, as
well as before, the Revolution of 1689, the absolute character of the
English sovereignty has been a common theory of lawyers. Blackstone,
writing in the reign of George the Third, asserts dogmatically that an
English King is absolute in the exercise of his prerogative. Blackstone
was able to find room beside an absolute prerogative for the national
liberties and Parliamentary privileges. So was Ralegh able. His language
seems now unconstitutional, when, in his _Maxims of State_, he
distinguishes the English 'Empire' from a 'limited Kingdom'; or when, in
this _Prerogative of Parliaments_, he declares that 'the three Estates
do but advise, as the Privy Council doth.' To him, however, 'limited'
meant more than now, and 'absolute' less. He saw no inconsistency
between the theory of royal absolutism and the application of popular
checks. Their reconciliation was the purpose of the essay of 1615. That
was evident to many excellent patriots of the next reign, who circulated
and gloried in a composition which proved the writer their fellow
worker. It was too apparent, though not to Hallam, to James, for the
dissertation to move him to any kindness. The basis and principle of the
discussion affronted all his prejudices. He was not to be beguiled by
admissions of his theoretical omnipotence into affection for a wise and
constitutional policy, which recognised popular rights. He had no
inclination to traverse the golden bridge Ralegh had built for his
return within the lines, whether of the Constitution, or of personal
justice. In all relations Ralegh was antipathetic to James without
consciousness of it. He could declare his implicit belief, in consonance
with strict constitutional orthodoxy, that the King loved the liberties
of his people, and that none but evil counsellors intercepted the signs
of his liberality. He could acknowledge the tender benignity of his
sovereign to himself, and throw upon