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sults of this law of practical railway management. Evidently the managers of two competing railway lines have but two possible courses open. They may, by tacit or formal agreement, unite in fixing common rates on both the roads, or they _may_ attempt to do business with free competition. But we have already proven that the latter course must result in reducing the income of the road certainly below the amount necessary to pay the operating expenses and the interest on the bonds, and probably it will be insufficient to pay the running expenses alone. The inevitable result, then, is the bankruptcy of the weaker road, the appointment of a receiver, and its sale, in all probability to its stronger competitor. This is the chain of cause and effect which has wrought the consolidation of competing parallel roads in scores of cases, and which, if free competition is allowed to act, is sure to do so. We can now appreciate the _necessity_ which managers of competing lines are under to agree upon uniform rates for traffic over their roads, and at the same time the difficulty of doing this. The strange paradox is true that while it is _necessary_ to the continued solvent existence of the competing corporations that such an agreement be made, it is also greatly to their advantage to break it secretly and secure additional traffic. It is necessary, therefore, that the parties to the agreement be strongly bound to maintain it inviolate; and to effect this, "pools" were established. In pooling traffic, each company paid either the whole or a percentage of their traffic receipts into a common fund, which was divided among the companies forming the pool, according to an agreed ratio. Under this method it is evident that all incentive to secret cutting of rates and dishonest methods for stealing additional traffic from another road was taken away. How widespread and universal is the restraint of competition by railway corporations may be seen by the following pithy words, penned by Charles Francis Adams, President of the Union Pacific Railway: "Irresponsive and secret combinations among railways always have existed, and, so long as the railroad system continues as it now is, they unquestionably always will exist. No law can make two corporations, any more than two individuals, actively undersell each other in any market, if they do not wish to do so. But they can only cease doing so by agreeing, in publi
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