the tie as equivalent to marriage if only
it is permanent? At what point does mere cohabitation pass into
marriage?

All these are questions which have to be debated and decided before we
are in possession of a suitable terminology for dealing with the unions
of the sexes in the lower stages of culture. But they are commonly
neglected in controversies as to the origin and history of human
marriage.

We have seen above that in a European community we mean by marriage a
union between two persons of opposite sexes, entered into with due legal
formalities, and not dissoluble simply at the will of either or both the
parties concerned. When we go further afield the connotation of the term
is extended to embrace (1) polygyny, in which one male is associated
with two or more females, (2) polyandry, in which one female is
similarly associated with more than one male, and (3) the condition
which I propose to term polygamy, in which both these conditions are
found. In all these cases the union is properly termed marriage, in so
far as it cannot be entered upon without due formalities nor be
dissolved without the concurrence of the authority upon the carrying out
of whose conditions in the preliminary steps the union depends for its
marriage-character.

When however we come to the so-called group marriage, using the term in
its original sense of limited promiscuity, we are dealing with an
entirely different state of things, and it is difficult to see any
justification for the use of the term marriage in this connection at
all. By group marriage is meant a condition only removed from absolute
promiscuity by the existence of age-classes or of two or more exogamous
classes in the community; it demands no special ceremonies prior to the
individual union[141], it permits this union to be dissolved at will,
and it consequently confers no rights on either of the parties to it,
other than perhaps the right to the produce, or some of the produce, of
each other's labour.

If the confusion did not extend beyond the terminology, the advance of
knowledge would perhaps be but little impeded; but experience shows that
confusion in terminology is apt to go hand in hand with confusion in
ideas. As will be shown later, this seems to be particularly true of
investigations into the history of marriage and sexual relationships. It
seems desirable therefore to clear the way by classifying the ideas with
which we have to deal, and by defining the t