the confidence of the signatory states that each and
all will abide by their undertaking, and, secondly, the uncovenanted
condition that they will accept and carry into effect the awards or
recommendations of the arbitral and conciliation commissions. These
proposals, however, furnish no sanctions or guarantees other than those
of conscience and public opinion for the due performance of the treaty
obligations, and make no attempt to bind the parties to an acceptance of
the decision of the commissions. Moreover, regarded as a means of
securing world-peace and disarmament, all such proposals appear
defective in that they make no provision for disputes between one or
more of the signatory states and outside states which are no parties to
the arrangement.

Such considerations have moved many to seek to strengthen the bond of
the alliance, and to make it available for mutual support against
outside aggression. The vital issue here is one of sanctions or the use
of joint force, diplomatic, economic, or military, to compel the
fulfilment of treaty obligations and the execution of the awards. Many
hold that, while most civilized states might be relied upon to carry out
their undertakings, some powerful state--Germany, or Russia, or
Japan--could not be trusted, and that this want of confidence would
oblige all nations to maintain large armaments with all their attendant
risks and burdens. To obviate this difficulty, it is proposed by some
that the signatories shall pledge themselves to take joint action,
diplomatic, economic, or forcible, against any of their members who, in
defiance of the treaty obligations, makes or proposes an armed attack
upon another member. This is the measure of stiffening added by Mr.
Lowes Dickinson in his constructive pamphlet _After the War_: 'The
Powers entering into the arrangement' are to 'pledge themselves to
assist, if necessary, by their national forces, any member of the League
who should be attacked before the dispute provoking the attack has been
submitted to arbitration or conciliation.' A state, however, by Mr.
Dickinson's scheme, is still to remain at liberty to refuse an award,
and after the prescribed period, even to make war for the enforcement of
its demands. Other peace-leaguers go somewhat further, assigning to the
league an obligation to use economic or forcible pressure for securing
the acceptance of the award of the Court of Arbitration, though leaving
the acceptance of the reco